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Professor of Law, University of the Western Cape
I INTRODUCTION
South African law’s traditional deﬁnition of ‘family’ in its narrow meaning
refers to heterosexual spouses in a valid civil marriage and their children.1
However, the notion of the ‘constitutional family’ — the family concept
redeﬁned under constitutional imperatives — is a pertinent feature of South
African jurisprudence since the advent of our democratic constitutional
dispensation; in fact, the term ‘constitutional family’ has become accepted
and frequently used legal terminology in the post-1994 era.2
Unsurprisingly, the constitutional family took judicial and legislative shape
not only in SouthAfrican family law,3 but also in the law of succession. In the
latter regard South African High Courts and the Constitutional Court
produced, particularly since 2003, a considerable volume of constitutional
case law that marked a break with the traditional exclusive family concept in
favour of a wider inclusive conception of ‘family.’ The judgments dealt
speciﬁcally with the application of the Intestate Succession Act 81 of 1987
and the Maintenance of Surviving Spouses Act 27 of 1990 to family
relationships beyond the ambit of the traditional nuclear family as constituted
through a valid civil marriage. The landmark Constitutional Court judg-
ments in this regard are Daniels v Campbell,4 Bhe v Magistrate, Khayelitsha;
Shibi v Sithole; SA Human Rights Commission v President of the RSA,5 Volks v
Robinson,6 Gory v Kolver (Starke & others intervening)7 and Hassam v Jacobs.8
* LLB LLM LLD (Stell). I thank Professors Francois de Villiers and Sonia Human
for their valuable comments on earlier drafts of this article.
1 D S PCronjé & JacquelineHeaton South African Family Law 2 ed (2004) 3.
2 See eg Julia Sloth-Nielsen & Belinda van Heerden ‘The constitutional family:
Developments in South African family law jurisprudence under the 1996 Constitu-
tion’ (2003) 17 International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family 121.
3 See eg Minister of Home Affairs v Fourie (Doctors for Life International, Amici
Curiae); Lesbian and Gay Equality Project v Minister of Home Affairs 2006 (1) SA 524
(CC) and the consequent Civil UnionAct 17 of 2006.
4 2004 (5) SA331 (CC).
5 2005 (1) BCLR 1 (CC).
6 2005 (5) BCLR 446 (CC).
7 2007 (4) SA97 (CC).
8 2009 (5) SA572 (CC).
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This judicial activity regarding the aforementioned two statutes was not
unexpected, as intestate succession and spousal maintenance are closely
aligned to socio-economic and legal notions of how a family is constituted.9
To date the South African legislature has contributed to the redeﬁnition of
the family concept (for purposes of the discussion that follows) principally
through the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998, the
Repeal of the BlackAdministrationAct andAmendment of Certain LawsAct
28 of 2005, the Civil Union Act 17 of 2006 and the Reform of Customary
Law of Succession and Regulation of Related Matters Act 11 of 2009. The
(somewhat controversial) draft Bill on Islamic Marriages (originally proposed
in 2003) and the draft Domestic Partnerships Bill, 2008 will, if enacted, add
to legislative activity in this regard.
This contribution traces the development of the constitutional family in
the law of succession through, ﬁrst, a synopsis of the aforementioned
Constitutional Court judgments as well as a number of High Court
judgments on the application of the Intestate Succession Act and the
Maintenance of Surviving Spouses Act and, secondly, an overview of
legislative developments regarding these two statutes. Thereafter, an attempt
is made at the extraction of the constitutional underpinnings of the
aforementioned developments. Next, the effect of case law and legislative
activity on the term ‘spouse’ for purposes of the aforementioned two statutes
is tabulated and its current and future effect on the relevant provisions of the
Intestate SuccessionAct is explained.
II THE ‘PROBLEMATIC’ PROVISIONS OF THE INTESTATE
SUCCESSION ACT AND MAINTENANCE OF SURVIVING
SPOUSES ACT
(1) The Intestate Succession Act
Section 1 of the Intestate SuccessionAct determines how intestate estates are
divided amongst deceased persons’ intestate heirs.10 Section 1(1) of the Act
regulates such division in the successive parentelae of the South African
intestate succession system. The Act designates the deceased’s surviving
spouse as an intestate heir. Moreover, inheritance by the deceased’s intestate
heirs in the second and further parentelae can occur only if the deceased is
not survived by a spouse or a descendant. Despite the central position that a
deceased’s surviving spouse assumes in respect of inheritance from the
deceased’s intestate estate, the Intestate SuccessionAct contains no deﬁnition
of ‘spouse.’ However, it was traditionally accepted that ‘spouse’ for purposes
of the Intestate Succession Act means a surviving partner to a valid civil
9 See generally M J de Waal ‘The social and economic foundations of the law of
succession’ (1997) 2 Stell LR 162.
10 The Intestate Succession Act commenced on 18 March 1988 and was amended
by the Law of SuccessionAmendmentAct 43 of 1992. The latterAct commenced on
1October 1992.
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marriage.11 Moreover, ‘spouse’ is throughout the Act used in the singular,
which was traditionally taken to denote one spouse only.12
The Intestate SuccessionAct determines that a deceased’s surviving spouse
ﬁts into the scheme of intestate succession as follows:
• s 1(1)(a): if the deceased is survived by a spouse, but not by a descendant,
such spouse inherits the intestate estate;
• s 1(1)(c)(i): if the deceased is survived by a spouse as well as a descendant,
such spouse inherits a child’s share of the intestate estate or so much of the
intestate estate as does not exceed in value the amount ﬁxed from time to
time by the Minister of Justice13 by notice in the Government Gazette,14
whichever amount is the greater;
• s 1(1)(d)–(f): division of an intestate estate in the second and further
parentelae can occur only if the deceased is not survived by a spouse or a
descendant;
• s 1(4)(f): for purposes of s 1(1)(c)(i), a child’s share of an intestate estate is
calculated by dividing the monetary value of the estate by a number equal
to the number of children of the deceased who have either survived the
deceased or who have died before the deceased but are survived by their
descendants, plus one; and
• s 1(6): if a descendant of a deceased, excluding a minor or mentally ill
descendant, who, together with the surviving spouse of the deceased is
entitled to a beneﬁt from an intestate estate, renounces the right to
receive such a beneﬁt, such beneﬁt vests in the surviving spouse.
(2) The Maintenance of Surviving Spouses Act
The Maintenance of Surviving Spouses Act15 provides a ‘survivor’ in certain
circumstances with a maintenance claim against the estate of a deceased
spouse. Section 2(1) of the Act determines that, if a marriage is dissolved by
death after the commencement of theAct, the survivor has a claim against the
estate of the deceased spouse for the provision of the survivor’s reasonable
maintenance needs until death or remarriage in so far as the survivor is unable
to provide therefore from own means and earnings. ‘Survivor’ for purposes
11 De Waal supra note 9 at 173. In fact, one of the invariable consequences of the
conclusion of a valid civil marriage is that the status of the spouses changes to enable
intestate inheritance by the surviving spouse on the death of the ﬁrst-dying spouse:
see Cronjé &Heaton supra note 1 at 49.
12 Section 6(b) of the Interpretation Act 33 of 1957 determines that, in every law,
words in the singular number include the plural unless a contrary intention appears.
The Intestate Succession Act bears reference throughout to ‘spouse’ and, unlike the
use of ‘descendant’ in s 1(1) and ‘descendants’ in s 1(4)(a), therefore provides no
indication that ‘spouse’encompasses multiple spouses— it is thus arguable that, in this
regard, the singular does not include the plural. See further the discussion of Hassam v
Jacobs supra note 8 infra under III (6).
13 Now theMinister of Justice andConstitutional Development.
14 Currently R125 000 in terms of GN 483 GG 11188 of 18March 1988.
15 TheAct commenced on 1 July 1990.
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of the Act is deﬁned in s 1 thereof as ‘the surviving spouse in a marriage
dissolved by death.’TheAct deﬁnes neither ‘surviving spouse’nor ‘marriage,’
but, as with the Intestate Succession Act, these terms were traditionally
afforded the meaning of a surviving partner to a valid civil marriage.16
Similarly, the use of the singular ‘survivor’ throughout the Act was tradition-
ally taken to denote a single surviving spouse only.17
III A SYNOPSIS OF JUDGMENTS ON THE PROVISIONS OF
THE INTESTATE SUCCESSION ACT AND MAINTENANCE
OF SURVIVING SPOUSES ACT
(1) Daniels v Campbell
In the court a quo of Daniels v Campbell18 Van Heerden J held that the
omission from s 1(4) of the Intestate SuccessionAct of a deﬁnition of ‘spouse’
that includes a husband or wife married in accordance with Muslim rites in a
de facto monogamous union is unconstitutional and invalid. She ordered that
this unconstitutionality had to be cured through a reading-in of such a
deﬁnition in a new para (g) to follow after s 1(4)(f) of theAct.19 Moreover, the
judge held that the omission from s 1 of the Maintenance of Surviving
Spouses Act of a deﬁnition of ‘survivor’ that includes the surviving husband
or wife of a de facto monogamous union solemnized in accordance with
Muslim rites is unconstitutional and invalid. She ordered that this unconsti-
tutionality had to be cured through a reading-in of such a deﬁnition in s 1 of
theAct.20
In Daniels v Campbell21 the majority of the Constitutional Court set aside
the above order of Van Heerden J. Both Sachs J and Ngcobo J held that, for
purposes of the twoActs in issue, the word ‘spouse’must be given its ordinary
meaning, which, according to both judges, is inclusive of parties to a
monogamous Muslim marriage.22 The Constitutional Court, therefore,
ordered that ‘spouse’ as used in the Intestate Succession Act and ‘survivor’ as
used in the Maintenance of Surviving Spouses Act includes the surviving
partner to a monogamous Muslim marriage.23
16 Daniels v Campbell 2003 (9) BCLR 969 (C) at 988B; Hassam v Jacobs supra note 8
para 45.
17 Hassam v Jacobs [2008] 4All SA350 (C) para 21.
18 2003 (9) BCLR 969 (C).
19 At 1005A–C.
20 At 1005D–E. See the critique of this decision by Nazeem Goolam & Christa
Rautenbach ‘The legal status of a Muslim wife under the law of succession: Is she still
a whore in terms of SouthAfrican law?’ (2004) 2 Stell LR 369.
21 2004 (5) SA331 (CC).
22 Paragraphs 19, 21, 30 and 57.
23 Paragraph 40.
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(2) Bhe v Magistrate, Khayelitsha
In Bhe v Magistrate, Khayelitsha; Shibi v Sithole; SA Human Rights Commission v
President of the RSA24 the Constitutional Court declared, inter alia, that s 23
of the Black Administration Act 38 of 1927 is inconsistent with the
Constitution and invalid.25 Moreover, the Court declared that s 1(4)(b) of the
Intestate Succession Act is inconsistent with the Constitution and invalid.26
The Court ordered further that s 1 of the Intestate Succession Act applies to
intestate deceased estates that would formerly have been governed by s 23 of
the Black Administration Act.27 However, in applying s 1(1)(c)(i) and 1(4)(f)
of the Intestate SuccessionAct in this regard to the estate of a deceased person
who was survived by more than one spouse, Langa DCJ ordered the
implementation of the following rule:
‘(a) A child’s share in relation to the intestate estate of the deceased, shall be
calculated by dividing the monetary value of the estate by a number equal
to the number of children of the deceased who have either survived or
predeceased such deceased person but are survived by their descendants,
plus the number of spouses who have survived such deceased;
(b) each surviving spouse shall inherit a child’s share of the intestate estate or
so much of the intestate estate as does not exceed in value the amount
ﬁxed from time to time by the Minister of Justice and Constitutional
Development by notice in the Gazette, whichever is the greater; and
(c) notwithstanding the provisions of sub-para (b) above, where the assets in
the estate are not sufﬁcient to provide each spouse with the amount ﬁxed
by the Minister, the estate shall be equally divided between the surviving
spouses.’28
(3) Volks v Robinson
In the court a quo of Robinson v Volks29 Davis J ruled that the omission from
the deﬁnition of ‘survivor’ in s 1 of the Maintenance of Surviving Spouses
Act of the words ‘and includes the surviving partner of a life partnership’30 at
the end of the existing deﬁnition is unconstitutional and invalid. He ordered
that this unconstitutionality had to be cured through a reading-in of the
words ‘and includes the surviving partner of a life partnership’ after the words
‘dissolved by death’ in the deﬁnition.31 Moreover, the judge found that the
24 2005 (1) BCLR 1 (CC).
25 Paragraph 136.
26 Paragraph 136. Section 1(4)(b) of the Act determines that ‘intestate estate’ for
purposes of s 1 of the Act includes any part of any estate which does not devolve by
virtue of a will or in respect of which s 23 of the Black Administration Act does not
apply.
27 Paragraph 136.
28 Paragraph 136. In paragraph 125 Langa DCJ emphasized that the above rule
constitutes a qualiﬁcation, rather than a substitution, of, particularly, s 1(4)(f) of the
Act.
29 2004 (6) BCLR 671 (C).
30 In casu the life partners were heterosexual.
31 At 684G–H.
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omission from the existing deﬁnitions in s 1 of the Act of a deﬁnition of
‘spouse’ that includes a person in a permanent life-partnership and of
‘marriage’ that includes a permanent life-partnership is unconstitutional and
invalid. He ordered that this unconstitutionality had to be cured through a
reading-in of such deﬁnitions in s 1 of theAct.32
In Volks v Robinson33 the majority of the Constitutional Court declined to
conﬁrm the order of Davis J. The majority judges were concerned, ﬁrst, with
unduly straining the words of the Maintenance of Surviving Spouses Act
through the inclusion of permanent life-partners thereunder.34 Secondly, the
majority opined that any discrimination on the basis of marital status
occasioned by the exclusion of permanent life-partners from theAct does not
constitute unfair discrimination.35 The fact that heterosexual couples enjoy
freedom of choice regarding marriage and, consequently, that a heterosexual
couple’s decision not to marry negates their entitlement to the protection
afforded by the Act, constituted a third reason why the majority did not
conﬁrm the court a quo’s order.36
(4) Gory v Kolver
In the court a quo of Gory v Kolver37 Hartzenberg J found that the omission
after the word ‘spouse’ wherever it appears in s 1(1) of the Intestate
Succession Act of the words ‘or partner in a permanent same-sex life
partnership in which the partners have undertaken reciprocal duties of
support’ is unconstitutional. The judge ordered that this unconstitutionality
had to be cured through a reading-in of the words ‘or partner in a permanent
same-sex life partnership in which the partners have undertaken reciprocal
duties of support’ after the word ‘spouse’ wherever it appears in s 1(1) of the
Act.38
In Gory v Kolver (Starke & others intervening)39 the Constitutional Court,
despite not conﬁrming the order of Hartzenberg J in its entirety, nevertheless
concluded that the judge correctly found that s 1(1) of the Intestate
Succession Act is unconstitutional and invalid as indicated above.40 More-
over, the reading-in of the words ordered by the court a quo is indeed the
appropriate remedy in casu.41 Van HeerdenAJ, therefore, declared that, with
effect from 27 April 1994, the omission after the word ‘spouse’ wherever it
appears in s 1(1) of the Intestate Succession Act of the words ‘or partner in a
32 At 684I–685B.
33 2005 (5) BCLR 446 (CC).
34 Paragraphs 41–5.
35 Paragraphs 49–50 and 60.
36 Paragraph 91. See the critique of this decision byAnita Cooke ‘Choice, hetero-
sexual life partnership, death and poverty’ (2005) 122 SALJ 542.
37 2006 (5) SA145 (T).
38 At 159C–E.
39 2007 (4) SA97 (CC).
40 Paragraph 19.
41 Paragraph 26.
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permanent same-sex life partnership in which the partners have undertaken
reciprocal duties of support’ is unconstitutional and invalid. She ordered that,
with effect from 27 April 1994, s 1(1) of the Act is to be read as though the
words ‘or partner in a permanent same-sex life partnership in which the
partners have undertaken reciprocal duties of support’ appear after the word
‘spouse’wherever the latter word appears in s 1(1) of the Intestate Succession
Act.42
(5) Kambule v The Master
In Kambule v The Master43 the applicant, K, who was married to the deceased,
B, in terms of customary law until the latter’s death, claimed, inter alia,
maintenance from the deceased’s estate in terms of the Maintenance of
Surviving Spouses Act. However, the deceased was, until his death, also
married to NB by civil rites according to the provisions of the Black
Administration Act — the deceased’s marital status was therefore polygy-
nous. Pickering J held as follows regarding the applicant’s maintenance claim:
‘Once the concession has been made that there is no room for any discrimina-
tory interpretation of the section [s 2(1) of the Maintenance of Surviving
Spouses Act] it cannot be contended that the surviving partner to a valid
customary marriage which in terms of s 2(1) of the Recognition Act [the
Recognition of Customary MarriagesAct] is to be ‘‘for all purposes’’ recognised
as a marriage, is not a ‘‘spouse’’within the meaning of s 2(1) of the Maintenance
of Surviving Spouses Act. There can be no doubt whatsoever, in light of the
provisions of s 2(1) of the Recognition Act and on a proper, constitutionally
acceptable interpretation of s 2(1) of the Maintenance of Surviving Spouses
Act, that, if the applicant can establish that she was validly married at customary
law to Burton [the deceased] at the time of his death, she would fall within the
deﬁnition of ‘‘survivor’’ in terms of s 2(1) of the Maintenance of Surviving
SpousesAct.’44
Judgment was consequently given in favour of the applicant and the
executor of the deceased’s estate was ordered to amend the ﬁrst and ﬁnal
liquidation and distribution account by admitting the applicant’s claim for
maintenance against the deceased estate.45
(6) Hassam v Jacobs
In the court a quo of Hassam v Jacobs46 Van Reenen J dealt with the question
whether, on the facts before the court, the applicant, as one of the surviving
spouses to a polygynous Muslim marriage, could claim a child’s share of the
42 Paragraph 66(f). See the critique of this decision by Michael Cameron Wood-
Bodley ‘Intestate succession and gay and lesbian couples’ (2008) 125 SALJ 46. See
further Michael Cameron Wood-Bodley ‘Establishing the existence of a same-sex
partnership for purposes of intestate succession’ (2008) 125 SALJ 259.
43 2007 (3) SA403 (E).
44 At 414D–F.
45 At 406E–F and 414G–H.
46 [2008] 4All SA350 (C).
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deceased spouse’s intestate estate in terms of the Intestate Succession Act and
reasonable maintenance from the deceased spouse’s estate in terms of the
Maintenance of Surviving Spouses Act.47 Van Reenen J ordered, ﬁrst, that
the word ‘survivor’ as used in the Maintenance of Surviving Spouses Act
includes the surviving partner to a polygamous Muslim marriage.48 Secondly,
that the word ‘spouse’ as used in the Intestate Succession Act includes a
surviving partner to a polygamous Muslim marriage.49 Thirdly, that s 1(4)(f)
of the Intestate Succession Act is inconsistent with the Constitution to the
extent that it makes provision for only one spouse in a Muslim marriage to be
an intestate heir of the deceased spouse. Consequently, Van Reenen J
ordered that s 1(4)(f) of the Act is to be read as if the whole of it was
substituted by the following:
‘In the application of section 1(1)(c)(i) to the estate of a deceased person who is
survived by more than one spouse:
(a) A child’s share in relation to the intestate estate of the deceased, shall be
calculated by dividing the monetary value of the estate by a number equal
to the number of children of the deceased who have either survived or
predeceased such deceased person but are survived by their descendants,
plus the number of spouses who have survived such deceased;
(b) Each surviving spouse shall inherit a child’s share of the intestate estate or
so much of the intestate estate as does not exceed in value the amount
ﬁxed from time to time by the Minister of Justice and Constitutional
Development by notice in the Gazette, whichever is the greater; and
47 See Pieter Bakker ‘Toepassing van Islamitiese reg in Suid-Afrika’ (2008) 29
Obiter 533 on why the applicant in casu should in fact not have been regarded as the
surviving spouse of the deceased by reason of her obtaining a faskh (an annulment of a
marriage in terms of Islamic law) prior to the deceased’s death. However, both Van
Reenen J in the court a quo and Nkabinde J in the Constitutional Court proceeded
on the basis that the applicant’s marriage to the deceased was indeed extant at the time
of the latter’s death.
48 Paragraph 23.1.1–23.1.3. The judge was fortiﬁed in this conclusion by the fact
that, despite the word ‘survivor’ in the Maintenance of Surviving Spouses Act being
throughout preceded by the deﬁnite article ‘the’, denoting the singular, ie one survi-
vor, the directive in s 6 of the Interpretation Act (supra note 12) warranted the
conclusion that ‘survivor’ for purposes of the Maintenance of Surviving Spouses Act
can indeed also mean ‘survivors’; moreover that the mechanisms in theAct for deter-
mining the extent of a surviving spouse’s claim are capable of being applied irrespec-
tive of the number of spouses at hand and without unduly straining the language of
the Act (para 21). From a terminological perspective it is curious that Van Reenen J,
while throughout the judgment using the term ‘polygynous’, employs ‘polygamous’
when making the order. According to Cronjé & Heaton supra note 1 at 191,
polygyny is the practice by which a husband is permitted to take more than one wife;
polyandry, on the other hand, is the practice by which a wife may take more than one
husband, whereas polygamy permits both sexes to have more than one spouse. Mus-
lim marriages are, therefore, polygynous without necessarily being polygamous. The
judge should have been terminologically consistent in this regard. Nkabinde J
approached this terminological matter correctly in the Constitutional Court’s judg-
ment in Hassam para 1.
49 Paragraph 23.1.4–23.1.6. See the comment on terminology supra note 48.
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(c) Notwithstanding the provisions of sub-para (b) above, where the assets in
the estate are not sufﬁcient to provide each spouse with the amount ﬁxed
by the Minister, the estate shall be equally divided between the surviving
spouses.’50
The orders in respect of s 1(4)(f) of the Intestate Succession Act were
referred to the Constitutional Court for conﬁrmation.51
In Hassam v Jacobs52 Nkabinde J distinguished the judgment in Daniels v
Campbell from the present matter, particularly in so far as reading ‘spouse’ in
the Intestate Succession Act as bearing reference to more than one spouse
would, unlike the Act’s application to a monogamous Muslim marriage in
Daniels, indeed place an undue strain on the language of the Act. Conse-
quently, the constitutional invalidity of the impugned provisions of the
Intestate Succession Act had to be cured through a reading-in of words to
cure the defects.53 The reading-in involved adding the words ‘or spouses’
after each use of the word ‘spouse’ in the Act. The judge therefore ordered
that s 1 of the Intestate Succession Act is inconsistent with the Constitution
and invalid to the extent that it does not include more than one spouse in a
polygynous Muslim marriage under the protection it affords to ‘a spouse’ and
that s 1 of the Intestate Succession Act must be read as though the words ‘or
spouses’ appear after the word ‘spouse’wherever the latter word appears in s 1
of the Act. Moreover, in the application of ss 1(1)(c)(i) and 1(4)(f) of the
Intestate SuccessionAct to the estate of a deceased person who is survived by
more than one spouse, the following rules apply:
‘(a) a child’s share in relation to the intestate estate of the deceased shall be
calculated by dividing the monetary value of the estate by a number equal
to the number of the children of the deceased who have either survived or
predeceased such deceased person but are survived by their descendants,
plus the number of spouses who have survived such deceased;
(b) subject to paragraph (c), each surviving spouse shall inherit a child’s share
of the intestate estate or so much of the intestate estate as does not exceed
in value the amount ﬁxed from time to time by the Minister for Justice and
50 Paragraph 23.2–23.3. Van Reenen J’s formulation of the substitute provision
corresponds with the qualiﬁcation rule ordered by the Constitutional Court in Bhe in
respect of the application of s 1(4)(f) in instances where a deceased subject to custom-
ary law is survived by more than one spouse. However, as Jacqueline Heaton
‘Polygynous Muslim marriages’ JQR Family (2008) 3(2.3) (http://products.
jutalaw.co.za/nxt/gateway.dll?f=templates&fn=default.htm [accessed on 13 February
2009]) rightly points out, Van Reenen J’s reading-in order substitutes ‘the whole of’
s 1(4)(f) with a provision which relates ‘to the estate of a deceased person who is
survived by more than one spouse.’The effect of this reading-in order is that s 1(4)(f)
caters solely for de facto polygynous marriages and leaves the calculation of a child’s
share in monogamous marriages unregulated — a clearly untenable situation. It
would have been preferable if Van Reenen J had ordered the provision to be read in as
a paragraph (g), following s 1(4)(f). See also supra note 28.
51 Paragraph 23.4.
52 Supra note 8.
53 Paragraph 48.
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Constitutional Development by notice in the Gazette, whichever is the
greater; and
(c) where the assets in the estate are not sufﬁcient to provide each spouse with
the amount ﬁxed by the Minister, the estate shall be divided equally
amongst the surviving spouses.’54
Nkabinde J ordered further that the declaration of constitutional invalidity
operates retrospectively with effect from 27 April 1994, except that it does
not invalidate any transfer of ownership prior to the date of the order of any
property pursuant to the distribution of the residue of an estate, unless it is
established that, when transfer was effected, the transferee was on notice that
the property in question was subject to a legal challenge on the grounds upon
which the applicant brought the present application. Finally, the judge
ordered that, should any serious administrative or practical problems arise in
implementation of the order, any interested person may approach the
Constitutional Court for a variation of the order.55
(7) Govender v Ragavayah
Govender v Ragavayah56 concerned an application for an order that the word
‘spouse’ as used in s 1 of the Intestate Succession Act includes a surviving
partner to a monogamous Hindu marriage.57 The applicant and her late
husband concluded a marriage in accordance with Hindu rites in 2004,
which marriage was monogamous at all times.58 The marriage was not
registered in terms of the MarriageAct 25 of 1961 and no children were born
from the marriage.59 The applicant’s husband died intestate on 1 January
2007.60 Therefore, were the applicant to be successful, she would stand to
inherit as the deceased’s sole intestate heir in terms of s 1(1)(a) of the Intestate
SuccessionAct.61
MoosaAJ concluded, having had regard to a number of decisions in which
some consequences of a valid civil marriage were accorded legal recognition
in respect of Muslim marriages, that there is judicial support for the
proposition that a spouse of a marriage by Hindu rites may well have the
54 Paragraph 54.
55 Paragraph 55. The Constitutional Court in Hassam was not called upon to
pronounce onVanReenen J’s ruling that a maintenance claim in terms of theMainte-
nance of Surviving Spouses Act can lie in the context of a polygynous Muslim mar-
riage, particularly as the inclusion of multiple spouses under the word ‘survivor’ in the
Act does not occasion an undue linguistic strain. Although Van Reenen J’s reliance in
this regard on s 6 of the InterpretationAct appears sound, a ruling by another court in
future, along the lines of Nkabinde J’s judgment in Hassam, that the words ‘or survi-
vors’ should be read in wherever the word ‘survivor’ appears in the Maintenance of
Surviving SpousesAct, would not come as a surprise.
56 [2009] 1All SA371 (D).
57 Paragraph 1.
58 Paragraph 12.
59 Paragraphs 12 and 13.
60 Paragraph 9.
61 Paragraph 22.
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religious ‘marriage contract’ given some recognition by SouthAfrican law for
certain purposes.62 The judge therefore ordered that the word ‘spouse’ as
used in the Intestate Succession Act includes the surviving partner to a
monogamous Hindu marriage. The applicant was consequently declared the
spouse of the deceased for purposes of s 1 of the Intestate Succession Act and
her entitlement to inherit from the deceased’s estate was conﬁrmed.63
IV LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS THAT IMPACT ON THE
PROVISIONS OF THE INTESTATE SUCCESSION ACT AND
MAINTENANCE OF SURVIVING SPOUSES ACT
(1) The Recognition of Customary Marriages Act
Section 2(1)–(4) of the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act64 stipulates
that a valid customary marriage, existent at the commencement of the Act, is
recognized as a marriage for all purposes. Moreover, a customary marriage
entered into after the commencement of the Act, which complies with the
Act’s requirements, is recognized as a marriage for all purposes. In regard to
polygynous customary marriages, all valid customary marriages entered into
by a person before the commencement of theAct are recognized as marriages
for all purposes. Similarly, all customary marriages entered into by a person
after the commencement of theAct, which comply with theAct’s provisions,
are recognized as marriages for all purposes.
The Recognition of Customary Marriages Act brought an end to the
limited recognition previously afforded to customary marriages only for
certain purposes and conferred full legal recognition on such marriages. This
recognition would serve as a catalyst for the further legal developments
discussed hereunder in respect of customary marriages, inter alia, regarding
intestate inheritance and spousal maintenance claims upon the termination of
such a marriage through the death of one of the spouses.
(2) The Repeal of the Black Administration Act and Amendment of Certain
Laws Act
Section 1(4)(b) of the Intestate Succession Act provides that, in the applica-
tion of s 1 of the Act, ‘intestate estate’ includes, inter alia, any part of any
estate in respect of which s 23 of the BlackAdministrationAct does not apply.
Section 23 of the Black Administration Act formerly regulated the adminis-
tration of so-called ‘Black intestate deceased estates’, which estates would
consequently not devolve in terms of the Intestate Succession Act. As
indicated earlier, the Constitutional Court found that s 23 of the Black
62 Paragraph 41.
63 Paragraph 44. See also generally Christa Rautenbach ‘Indian succession laws
with special reference to the position of females:Amodel for SouthAfrica?’ (2008) 41
CILSA 105.
64 TheAct commenced on 15November 2000.
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AdministrationAct was unconstitutional.65 This provision was repealed in its
entirety by s 1(1) of the Repeal of the Black Administration Act and
Amendment of Certain Laws Act.66 The necessary implication of the repeal
of s 23 of the Black Administration Act was that the intestate estate of any
person who is subject to customary law would henceforth devolve in
accordance with the law of intestate succession as regulated by the Intestate
Succession Act — a state of affairs now acknowledged in the Reform of
Customary Law of Succession and Regulation of Related MattersAct.67
(3) The Civil Union Act
Section 13 of the Civil UnionAct68 regulates the legal consequences of a civil
union, namely that, in terms of s 13(1) of theAct, the legal consequences of a
marriage as contemplated in the Marriage Act apply, with such changes as
may be required by the context, to a civil union. Moreover, s 13(2)
prescribes that, with the exception of the Marriage Act and the Recognition
of Customary Marriages Act, any reference to ‘marriage’ in any other law,
including the common law, includes, with such changes as may be required
by the context, a civil union and ‘husband,’ ‘wife’ or ‘spouse’ in any other
law, including the common law, includes a civil-union partner.
(4) The Reform of Customary Law of Succession and Regulation of Related
Matters Act
The Reform of Customary Law of Succession and Regulation of Related
Matters Act69 is aimed at, inter alia, modifying the customary law70 of
succession through provision for the devolution of certain property in terms
of the law of intestate succession, and clarifying certain matters relating to the
law of succession in relation to persons subject to customary law. To this end,
theAct essentially conﬁrms and elaborates on the state of the law after the Bhe
case and the repeal of the BlackAdministrationAct.
65 Bhe supra note 24.
66 The Act commenced on 12 April 2006. For a useful overview of judicial and
legislative developments in respect of the administration of intestate estates of persons
subject to customary law from the time of s 23 of the Black AdministrationAct up to
the Repeal of the Black Administration Act and Amendment of Certain Laws Bill,
2005, see Lizmarie Kotzé & Christa Rautenbach ‘Bereddering van intestate boedels
van swart persone: Van toeka tot nou’ (2007) 70 THRHR 43. See also M C
Schoeman-Malan ‘Recent developments regarding SouthAfrican common and cus-
tomary law of succession’ (2007) 1 PER (www.puk.ac.za/opencms/export/PUK/html/
fakulteite/regte/per/issues/2007x1x_Schoeman_Malan_art.pdf [accessed 13 February
2009]).
67 See infra under IV(4).
68 TheAct commenced on 30November 2006.
69 The President assented to the Act on 19 April 2009, but the Act’s commence-
ment date was yet to be proclaimed at the time of writing.
70 ‘Customary law’ for purposes of the Act means, according to s 1 thereof, the
customs and practices observed among the indigenousAfrican people of SouthAfrica
which form part of the culture of those people.
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Section 2(1) of the Act provides that, subject to the interpretation rules
stipulated in s 2(2), the Intestate Succession Act regulates the devolution of
the estate or part of the estate of any person who is subject to customary law
and who dies after the commencement of the Act in so far as such person’s
estate does not devolve in terms of his or her will.
Section 2(2)(a)–(c) contains three interpretation rules in respect of the
Intestate SuccessionAct. First, where the person referred to in the aforemen-
tioned s 2(1) is survived by a spouse,71 as well as a descendant,72 such a spouse
must inherit a child’s portion of the intestate estate or so much of the intestate
estate as does not exceed in value the amount ﬁxed from time to time by the
Cabinet member responsible for the administration of justice by notice in the
Government Gazette, whichever is the greater. Secondly, a woman, other than
the spouse of the deceased, with whom he had entered into a union in
accordance with customary law for the purpose of providing children for his
spouse’s house73 must, if she survives him, be regarded as a descendant of the
deceased. Finally, if the deceased was a woman who was married to another
woman under customary law for the purpose of providing children for the
deceased’s house, that other woman must, if she survives the deceased, be
regarded as a descendant of the deceased.
Section 3 of the Act instructs how an intestate estate is to be divided in
accordance with the provisions of the Intestate Succession Act when the
deceased’s marital status was polygynous. First, s 3(1) determines that any
reference in s 1 of the Intestate Succession Act to a spouse who survived the
deceased must be construed as including every spouse and every woman
71 ‘Spouse’ for purposes of theAct includes, according to s 1 thereof, a partner in a
customary marriage that is recognized in terms of s 2 of the Recognition of Custom-
aryMarriagesAct.
72 ‘Descendant’ for purposes of the Act means, according to s 1 thereof, a person
who is a descendant in terms of the Intestate Succession Act. Moreover, it also
includes a person who is not a descendant in terms of the Intestate SuccessionAct but
who, during the lifetime of the deceased person, was accepted by the deceased person
in accordance with customary law as his or her own child. This is likely to include,
inter alia, children adopted in terms of customary law, children born from woman-
to-woman marriages, children born from supporting marital unions as well as chil-
dren procreated on behalf of a sterile husband. Section 1 determines further that
‘descendant’ for purposes of the Act also includes a woman referred to in s 2(2)(b) or
(c) of the Reform of Customary Law of Succession and Regulation of Related Mat-
ters Act. However, see in the latter regard infra note 74. Given the Act’s reference to
‘a person who is a descendant in terms of the Intestate Succession Act,’ it is notewor-
thy that the Intestate Succession Act contains no deﬁnition of ‘descendant’ for pur-
poses of that Act. In Flynn v Farr 2009 (1) SA 584 (C) para 15 Davis J opined that, for
purposes of the Intestate Succession Act, ‘a descendant is for all intents and purposes
‘‘a child of the deceased.’’ ’ It is submitted, however, that the judge’s view in this
regard is too narrow and that ‘descendant’ for purposes of the Intestate SuccessionAct
generally includes also grandchildren, great-grandchildren, etc: see M J de Waal &
MCSchoeman-Malan Law of Succession 4 ed (2008) 16.
73 ‘House’ for purposes of the Act means, according to s 1 thereof, the family,
property, rights and status which arise out of the customarymarriage of a woman.
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referred to in the aforementioned s 2(2)(a)–(c) of the Reform of Customary
Law of Succession and Regulation of Related Matters Act.74 Secondly, s 3(2)
provides that, for purposes of the Reform of Customary Law of Succession
and Regulation of Related Matters Act and in the application of s 1(1)(c) of
the Intestate SuccessionAct, the following subparagraph must be regarded as
having been added to that section:
‘(iii) where the intestate estate is not sufﬁcient to provide each surviving
spouse and woman referred to in paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) of section 2(2)
of the Reform of Customary Law of Succession and Regulation of
Related Matters Act, 2008,75 with the amount ﬁxed by the Minister, the
estate shall be divided equally between such spouses.’
Finally, s 3(3) stipulates that, in determining a child’s portion for purposes
of dividing the estate of a deceased in terms of the Intestate Succession Act,
s 1(4)(f) of thatAct must be regarded to read as follows:
‘(f) a child’s portion, in relation to the intestate estate of the deceased, shall be
calculated by dividing the monetary value of the estate by a number equal
to the number of children of the deceased who have either survived the
deceased or have died before the deceased but are survived by their
descendants, plus the number of spouses and women referred to in
paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) of section 2(2) of the Reform of Customary Law
of Succession and Regulation of Related MattersAct, 2008.’
As remarked earlier, the above-stated provisions essentially conﬁrm and
elaborate on the state of the law after the Bhe case and the repeal of the Black
Administration Act. However, further amendments to the Intestate Succes-
sion Act are prescribed in the Schedule to the Reform of Customary Law of
Succession and Regulation of Related Matters Act, read with s 8 of the Act
regarding the amendment of laws. First, s 1(2) of the Intestate SuccessionAct
is substituted by the following subsection:
‘Notwithstanding the provisions of any law or the common or customary law,
but subject to the provisions of this Act and sections 40(3) and 297(1)(f) of the
Children’s Act, 2005 (Act No. 38 of 2005), having been born out of wedlock
shall not affect the capacity of one blood relation to inherit the intestate estate of
another blood relation.’
The above substitution is necessitated by the repeal of the Children’s Status
Act 82 of 1987 (to which s 1(2) previously referred regarding children
74 The contradiction between s 2(2)(b) and (c), on the one hand, and s 3, on the
other, of the Act is perplexing: in terms of the former, a woman, as referred to in the
paragraphs, is, upon surviving the deceased, regarded as a descendant of the deceased
for purposes of intestate succession (see also the deﬁnition of ‘descendant’ in s 1 of the
Act), whereas the self-same woman is, in terms of s 3, included as a surviving spouse
of the deceased for purposes of the Intestate SuccessionAct.
75 Certain sections of theAct still bear reference to 2008, the date of the last version
of the Reform of Customary Law of Succession and Regulation of Related Matters
Bill. This error will hopefully be corrected before the commencement of theAct.
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conceived by artiﬁcial insemination) by the Children’s Act 38 of 2005.76
Section 40(3)77 of the latter Act now contains corresponding provisions in
respect of children conceived by artiﬁcial fertilisation in that it stipulates that,
subject to s 296 of the Act, no right, responsibility, duty or obligation arises
between a child born of a woman as a result of artiﬁcial fertilisation and any
person whose gamete was or gametes were used for such fertilisation or the
blood relatives of such a person. This rule is subject to a dual exception in that
applicable rights, responsibilities, duties or obligations will arise when that
person is the woman who gave birth to that child or that person was the
husband of such woman at the time of the artiﬁcial fertilisation. Section
297(1)(f)78 of the Children’s Act stipulates that the effect of a valid surrogate
motherhood agreement is that the child concerned will have no claim for
maintenance or of succession against the surrogate mother, her husband or
partner or any of their relatives.
Furthermore, inclusion of a reference to customary law in addition to ‘any
law or the common law’ to which the s 1(2) of the Intestate Succession Act
was previously conﬁned, serves as conﬁrmation of the ruling in Bhe that the
rule of male primogeniture as applied in customary law in respect of
inheritance on intestacy is inconsistent with the Constitution and invalid to
the extent that it excluded or hindered, inter alia, children born out of
wedlock from inheriting property.79 Finally, substitution of the term ‘illegiti-
macy’ previously used in the subsection with the phrase ‘having been born
out of wedlock’ is in line with the modern trend to use the latter rather than
the former in statutory formulation.80
The repeal of s 23 of the Black Administration Act necessitates the second
amendment prescribed in the Schedule, namely the deletion of the reference
to s 23 from s 1(4)(b) of the Intestate Succession Act. This paragraph will
henceforth simply read: ‘‘ ‘[I]ntestate estate’’ includes any part of an estate
which does not devolve by virtue of a will’. Moreover, s 1(4)(e) of the
Intestate SuccessionAct is amended by the insertion of a new para (eA):
‘A person referred to in paragraph (a) of the deﬁnition of ‘‘descendant’’
contained in section 1 of the Reform of Customary Law of Succession and
Regulation of Related MattersAct, 2009, shall be deemed —
(i) to be a descendant of the deceased person referred to in that paragraph;
(ii) not to be a descendant of his or her natural parent or parents, except in the
case of a natural parent who is also the parent who accepted that person in
accordance with customary law as his or her own child, as envisaged in the
76 See the list of statutes repealed by the Children’s Act in Schedule 4 thereof. The
repeal of the Children’s StatusAct is effective from 1 July 2007.
77 Section 40 commenced on 1 July 2007.
78 Section 297was not yet in operation at the time of writing.
79 Bhe supra note 5 para 93.
80 See eg s 2D(1)(b) of the Wills Act 7 of 1953 as inserted by s 4 of the Law of
Succession Amendment Act 43 of 1992; s 1(1) of the Births and Deaths Registration
Act 51 of 1992; s 36 of the Children’sAct.
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said deﬁnition, or was, at the time when the child was accepted, married
to the parent who so accepted the child.’
Finally, s 1(5) of the Intestate SuccessionAct is amended by the insertion of
a new subsec (5A):
‘If a person referred to in paragraph (a) of the deﬁnition of ‘‘descendant’’
contained in section 1 of the Reform of Customary Law of Succession and
Regulation of Related Matters Act, 2009, is deemed to be a descendant of the
deceased person referred to in that paragraph or is deemed not to be a
descendant of his or her natural parent, the deceased person shall be deemed to
be an ancestor of the person referred to in that paragraph, or shall be deemed
not to be an ancestor of that person, as the case may be.’
It is submitted that the last-mentioned two amendments were necessitated
particularly by the recognition of adoption in terms of customary law, in the
alternative to adoption in terms of ‘western law,’ in cases such as Kewana v
Santam Insurance Co Ltd81 and Metiso v Padongelukkefonds,82 but also in order
to provide expressly for the other possibilities created by the deﬁnition of
‘descendant’ in s 1 of theAct.83
The Schedule of the Reform of Customary Law of Succession and
Regulation of Related Matters Act also contains an amendment to the
deﬁnition of ‘survivor’ in s 1 of the Maintenance of Surviving Spouses Act.
This deﬁnition is to read:
‘ ‘‘[S]urvivor’’ means the surviving spouse in a marriage dissolved by death, and
includes a spouse of a customary marriage which was dissolved by a civil
marriage contracted by her husband in the customary marriage to another
woman on or after 1 January 1929 (the date of commencement of sections 22
and 23 of the Black Administration Act, 1927 (Act No. 38 of 1927), but before
2 December 1988 (the date of commencement of the Marriage and Matrimo-
nial Property LawAmendmentAct, 1988 (Act No. 3 of 1988)).’
This amendment conﬁrms the protection afforded to the so-called ‘discarded
spouse’ by s 1(f) of the Marriage and Matrimonial Property LawAmendment
Act of 1988. This provision substituted s 22(7) of the Black Administration
Act with the provision that, should a husband in a customary union have
contracted a marriage84 after the commencement of the Black Administra-
tion Act but before the commencement of the Marriage and Matrimonial
Property Law Amendment Act with any woman other than his wife, such a
marriage would not affect the material rights of his partner to the customary
81 1993 (4) SA771 (TkA) at 776B–D.
82 2001 (3) SA1142 (T) at 1149A–H.
83 See supra note 72.
84 ‘Marriage’ for purposes of the Black Administration Act was deﬁned, in s 35
thereof, as ‘the union of onemanwith one woman in accordance with any law for the
time being in force in any Province governing marriages, but does not include any
union contracted under Black law or custom or any union recognized as a marriage in
Black law under the provisions of section one hundred and forty-seven of the Code of
Black Law contained in the Schedule to Law 19 of 1891 (Natal) or any amendment
thereof or any other law.’
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union or any issue thereof. Moreover, the widow of any such marriage and
the issue thereof would have no greater rights in respect of the estate of the
deceased spouse than she or they would have had if the marriage had been a
customary union.
(5) The draft Bill on Islamic Marriages85
The draft Bill on Islamic Marriages (as proposed in the report of the South
African Law Reform Commission on Islamic Marriages and Related Matters
in Discussion Paper 101, Project 59) is aimed at, inter alia, providing for the
recognition of Islamic marriages.86 To this end, s 4(1)–(5) of the Bill stipulates
that an Islamic marriage entered into before the commencement of the
Islamic Marriages Act (once enacted) and existing at the commencement of
the Act is for all purposes recognized as a valid marriage. Moreover, an
Islamic marriage entered into after the commencement of the Act, which
complies with the Act’s requirements, is for all purposes recognized as a valid
marriage. In regard to polygynous Islamic marriages it is determined that, if a
husband is a spouse in more than one Islamic marriage, all Islamic marriages
entered into by him before the commencement of theAct are for all purposes
recognized as valid marriages. Moreover, if a husband is a spouse in more
than one Islamic marriage, all such marriages entered into after the com-
mencement of the Act, which comply with the Act’s provisions, are for all
purposes recognized as valid marriages. Finally, if a husband is a spouse in an
existing civil marriage and in an Islamic marriage or marriages entered into
before the commencement of the Act, such Islamic marriage is or marriages
are for all purposes recognized as valid marriages.
Moreover, s 16(3) of the Bill provides, regarding amendments to the
Intestate Succession Act, that s 1 of the Act is amended by the following
addition to subsec (4):
‘(g) ‘‘spouse’’ shall include a spouse of an Islamic marriage recognised in terms
of the Islamic Marriages Act, 20.. , and shall otherwise include the spouse
of a deceased person in a union recognised as a marriage in accordance
with the tenets of any religion:87 Provided that in the event of a deceased
man being survived by more than one spouse, the following shall apply —
85 The Bill is available at www.saflii.org//cgi-bin/disp.pl?file=za/other/zalc/report/
2003/3/2003_3-ANNEXURE-2.html&query=islamic%20marriages%20bill [accessed
on 16 May 2009]. In Women’s Legal Centre Trust v President of the Republic of South Africa
2009 (6) SA 94 (CC) the applicant sought an order from the Constitutional Court
that would compel the President and Parliament to enact the Bill on Islamic Mar-
riages, thereby making it law. The Constitutional Court ruled that the application is
‘misconceived’ as it (the Constitutional Court) could not serve as the court of ﬁrst
instance in thematter.
86 ‘Islamic marriage’ for purposes of the draft Bill means, according to s 1 thereof, a
marriage contracted in accordance with Islamic law only, but excludes an existing
civil marriage, or a civil marriage solemnized under the Marriage Act, before or after
the commencement of theAct (should the draft Bill become law).
87 The paragraph’s reference to ‘a marriage in accordance with the tenets of any
religion,’ thereby including marriages other than those concluded in accordance with
Muslim rites, is signiﬁcant in light of Govender’s case supra note 56.
THE CONSTITUTIONAL FAMILY IN THE LAW OF SUCCESSION 479
JOBNAME: SALJ 09 Part 3 PAGE: 18 SESS: 7 OUTPUT: Thu Feb 25 09:31:06 2010
/dtp22/juta/juta/SALJ−2009−Part3/02article
(i) for the purposes of subsection (1)(c), such surviving spouse shall
inherit the intestate estate in equal shares;88
(ii) for the purposes of subsection (1)(c), such surviving spouses shall
each inherit a child’s share of the intestate estate or so much of the
intestate estate in equal shares as does not exceed in value the amount
so ﬁxed as contemplated in this section.’
Section 16(4) of the Bill provides in regard to amendments to the
Maintenance of Surviving Spouses Act that s 1 of the Act is amended by the
following insertion after the deﬁnition of ‘survivor:’
‘ ‘‘Marriage’’ shall include an Islamic marriage recognised in terms of the Islamic
Marriages Act, 20.. , and shall otherwise include a union recognised as a
marriage in accordance with the tenets of any religion.’
(6) The draft Domestic Partnerships Bill89
Section 1 of the draft Domestic Partnerships Bill deﬁnes ‘domestic partner-
ship’ as ‘a registered domestic partnership or unregistered domestic partner-
ship between two persons who are both 18 years of age or older and includes
a former domestic partnership.’ ‘Domestic partner’ is deﬁned in s 1 as ‘a
partner in a domestic partnership and includes a former domestic partner.’
Section 19 of the Bill determines that, for purposes of the Domestic
Partnerships Act (once enacted), ‘spouse’ in the Maintenance of Surviving
Spouses Act must be construed to include a registered domestic partner.
Likewise, s 20 of the Bill provides that, for purposes of the Domestic
PartnershipsAct (once enacted), ‘spouse’ in the Intestate SuccessionAct must
be construed to include a registered domestic partner. Therefore, registered
domestic partners will have claims under both the aforementioned statutes
should the draft Bill become law.
As far as unregistered domestic partners are concerned, s 29 of the Bill
permits a surviving unregistered domestic partner to bring an application to
court, after the death of the other unregistered domestic partner, for an order
for the provision of the survivor’s reasonable maintenance needs from the
deceased partner’s estate. This claim is, in terms of ss 29 and 30, in format and
substance akin to a claim under the Maintenance of Surviving SpousesAct.
Section 31 of the Bill provides as follows for intestate succession on the
death of an unregistered domestic partner:
‘(1) Where an unregistered domestic partner dies intestate, his or her
surviving unregistered domestic partner may bring an application to court,
subject to subsections (2) and (3), for an order that he or she may inherit the
intestate estate.
(2) Where the deceased is survived by an unregistered domestic partner as
well as a descendant, such unregistered domestic partner inherits a child’s share
88 This formulation appears incorrect; presumably it should read: ‘for the purposes
of subsection (1)(a), such surviving spouses shall inherit the intestate estate in equal
shares.’
89 The draft Bill was published in GG 30663 of 14 January 2008.
THE SOUTH AFRICAN LAW JOURNAL480
JOBNAME: SALJ 09 Part 3 PAGE: 19 SESS: 5 OUTPUT: Thu Feb 25 09:31:06 2010
/dtp22/juta/juta/SALJ−2009−Part3/02article
of the intestate estate or so much of the intestate estate as does not exceed in
value the amount ﬁxed from time to time by the Cabinet member responsible
for the administration of Justice by notice in the Gazette, whichever is the
greater, as provided for in the Intestate SuccessionAct.
(3) In the event of a dispute between a surviving unregistered domestic
partner and the customary spouse of a deceased partner regarding the beneﬁts to
be awarded, a court may, upon application by either the unregistered domestic
partner or the customary spouse, make an order that it regards just and equitable
with reference to all the relevant circumstances of both relationships.’
V THE BILL OF RIGHTS’ FOUNDATIONAL VALUES FOR THE
ESTABLISHMENT OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL FAMILY IN
THE LAW OF SUCCESSION
Predictably, the judicial and legislative developments highlighted above
centred on the central theme of the Bill of Rights’ foundational values of
equality90 and human dignity.91 For example, in Daniels v Campbell Sachs J
opined that the ‘constitutional values of equality, tolerance and respect for
diversity point strongly in favour of giving the word ‘‘spouse’’ [for purposes
of the two Acts under discussion] a broad and inclusive construction;’92 an
opinion shared by Ngcobo J: ‘[i]t follows therefore that the word ‘‘spouse’’
must now be construed in a manner that is consistent with the foundational
values of human dignity, equality and freedom.’93 In Gory v Kolver (Starke &
others intervening) Van Heerden AJ concluded in similar vein that ‘Mr Gory
has established that the failure of s 1(1) of the [Intestate Succession] Act to
include him and others similarly situated to him within its ambit does violate
his rights to equality and dignity.’94 Likewise, the preamble of the Reform of
Customary Law of Succession and Regulation of Related Matters Act
declares that theAct is premised, inter alia, upon the fact that ‘section 9 of the
Constitution provides that everyone has the right to equal protection and
beneﬁt of the law.’
A number of sub-themes, all closely related to the aforementioned
foundational values of equality and human dignity, also emerge from the
judgments, legislation and bills discussed above. One such theme is that of
extending the protection afforded by the Intestate Succession Act and
Maintenance of Surviving Spouses Act to particularly vulnerable groupings
in society. For example, Sachs J remarked in his dissenting judgment in Volks
v Robinson that ‘[w]omen and children are vulnerable groups in our
society. . .The lack of legal protection afforded to domestic partnerships
increases the vulnerability of these groups living within such arrange-
90 Section 9 of the Constitution, 1996.
91 Section 10 of the Constitution, 1996.
92 Supra note 4 para 21.
93 Ibid para 56.
94 Supra note 7 para 40. See also Hassam supra note 8 paras 37, 38 and 46.
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ments.’95Another sub-theme is that of not perpetuating the past marginaliza-
tion of certain groupings in society, which theme is evident in Van Heerden
AJ’s remark in Gory v Kolver that ‘[b]earing in mind the signiﬁcant
pre-existing disadvantage and vulnerability of same-sex life partners resulting
from ‘‘the long history in our country and abroad of marginalisation and
persecution of gays and lesbians’’, it would not in my view be just and
equitable to deny Mr Gory any effective and equitable relief. . .’96
A further sub-theme is that of the legal recognition of and equal treatment
in regards to the social function of relationships other than those constituted
through civil marriage. An example of this theme is found in the opinion of
Mokgoro and O’Reagan JJ in their dissenting judgment in Volks v Robinson
that ‘[w]here relationships which are socially and functionally similar to
marriage are not regulated in the same way as marriage, discrimination on the
grounds of marital status will arise.’97Aﬁnal sub-theme is the need for the law
to accommodate the diversity that typiﬁes SouthAfrican society. In Robinson
v Volks Davis J alluded in this regard to the Constitutional Court’s recogni-
tion of the diversity of forms of life-partnership ‘and that marriage represents
but one form of life partnership.’98
In light of the above, it is submitted that the development of the
constitutional family in the law of succession is founded not only on core
constitutional values, but also on the socio-economic and legal realities that
establish the operational framework for these values.
VI A CONTEXTUALIZED EXPOSITION OF THE JUDICIAL
AND LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS TO DATE AND
LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS (LIKELY) IN THE FUTURE
REGARDING THE CONSTITUTIONAL FAMILY FOR
PURPOSES OF THE INTESTATE SUCCESSION ACT AND
THE MAINTENANCE OF SURVIVING SPOUSES ACT
(1) The term ‘spouse’ in the Intestate Succession Act and the Maintenance of
Surviving Spouses Act
The table below summarizes the foregoing synopsis of the current legal
position in respect of the re-deﬁnition of the term ‘spouse’ for purposes of the
aforementioned two statutes.
95 Supra note 6 para 171. See also Bhe supra note 5 para 93; Hassam supra note 46
para 12; Hassam supra note 8 paras 41 and 49.
96 Supra note 7 para 40.
97 Supra note 6 para 108. See also the preamble of the Civil Union Act and the
preamble of the Reform of Customary Law of Succession and Regulation of Related
MattersAct.
98 Supra note 29 at 677F. See also Hassam supra note 8 paras 27 and 46.
THE SOUTH AFRICAN LAW JOURNAL482
JOBNAME: SALJ 09 Part 3 PAGE: 21 SESS: 9 OUTPUT: Thu Feb 25 09:31:06 2010
/dtp22/juta/juta/SALJ−2009−Part3/02article
Intestate Succession Act: Maintenance of Surviving Spouses Act:
In terms of current law ‘spouse’(meaning the
deceased’s surviving spouse) includes:
In terms of current law ‘spouse’ in respect of
the deﬁnition of ‘survivor’ includes:
• a partner to a valid civil marriage
• a civil-union partner
• a partner to amonogamousMuslim
marriage
• a partner to amonogamousHindumar-
riage
• a partner to a customary-lawmarriage
and, if the deceased’s marital status was
polygynous, each such partner
• a partner to a permanent same-sex life-
partnership inwhich the partners have
undertaken reciprocal duties of support
• each partner to aMuslimmarriage
where the deceased’s marital status was
polygynous
In terms of the draft Bill on IslamicMarriages
‘spouse’ includes:
• a partner to an Islamicmarriage recog-
nized in terms of the IslamicMarriages
Act (once enacted) and the partner in a
union recognized as amarriage in accor-
dancewith the tenets of any religion; if
the deceased’s marital status was
polygynous, then each such partner
In terms of the draft Domestic Partnerships
Bill ‘spouse’ includes:
• a registered domestic partner, but an
unregistered partner can apply to court
for an order permitting inheritance ab
intestato
• a partner to a valid civil marriage
• a civil-union partner
• a partner to amonogamousMuslim
marriage
• a partner to a customary-lawmarriage,
which includes a customary-lawmar-
riage that was dissolved by a civil mar-
riage contracted by her husband in the
customarymarriage to anotherwoman
on or after 1 January 1929, but before
2December 1988 and, if the deceased’s
marital status was polygynous, then each
such partner
• each partner to aMuslimmarriage
where the deceased’s marital status was
polygynous
In terms of the draft Bill on IslamicMarriages
‘spouse’ includes:
• a partner to amarriage, which includes
an Islamicmarriage recognized in terms
of the IslamicMarriagesAct (once
enacted) and a union recognized as a
marriage in accordancewith the tenets
of any religion; if the deceased’s marital
status was polygynous, then each such
partner
In terms of the draft Domestic Partnerships
Bill ‘spouse’ includes:
• a registered domestic partner, but an
unregistered partner can apply to court
for an order for the provision of reason-
ablemaintenance
(2) The operation of the Intestate Succession Act regarding the deceased’s surviving
spouse(s) and descendant(s)
F G
B C[A]
i ii iii
2 1
D E
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(a) The traditional operation of the Intestate Succession Act
The Intestate Succession Act’s traditional operation pertains to the scenario
on the right-hand side of the above diagram, namely where the deceased, A,
who was a spouse in a valid monogamous civil marriage (Marriage 1), leaves a
surviving spouse, C, and (for ease of discussion) one descendant, E.
C, as A’s surviving spouse, and E, as A’s surviving intestate heir in the ﬁrst
parentela, share A’s estate only if its net value exceeds R125 000.99 If it does
not, C inherits the entire estate; if it does, but the estate’s net value is less than
R250 000, C inherits R125 000 of A’s estate and E the (lesser) residue. If the
estate’s net value is equal to or exceeds R250 000, C and E each inherit an
equal child’s share of A’s estate.100 A child’s share of the estate is calculated by
dividing its monetary value by two, which number represents E, as A’s sole
surviving child, plus one.101 Moreover, should E, a mentally healthy major,
renounce the right to receive her share ofA’s estate, such share vests in C.102
E inherits as indicated above in three scenarios. First, where E is the natural
child of A, born out of wedlock: E(i).103 Secondly, where E is an adopted
child; either one not biologically related to eitherAor C and adopted by both
A and C jointly: E(ii),104 or, alternatively, the child of C (whether from a
previous marriage, previously adopted or born out of wedlock with someone
other than A as biological parent) and adopted by A105 (for the sake of
99 See supra note 14.
100 Section 1(1)(c)(i) and (ii).
101 Section 1(4)(f).
102 Section 1(6). The Report on the Review of the Law of Succession (Project 22)
of June 1991 of the South African Law Commission (as it then was) reveals, in
paragraphs 5.48 and 5.53 thereof, that the insertion of s 1(6) in the Intestate Succes-
sion Act (by s 14(b) of the Law of Succession Amendment Act) was motivated by the
practical consideration ‘of children repudiating their inheritance in favour of the
surviving spouse.’One can surmise that the Law Commission and, indeed, the Legis-
lature had in mind in this regard a child’s renunciation of a right in favour of his or her
parent, but the formulation of s 1(6) of the Act, bearing general reference to ‘a
descendant of the deceased’, suggests that a repudiation by eg a child of the deceased
born out of wedlock will also result in accrual of the repudiated share in favour of the
deceased’s surviving spouse, even if such spouse is not the biological parent of the
repudiating descendant.
103 Section 1(2).
104 Section 17(a) of the Child Care Act 74 of 1983 determines that a child may be
adopted by a husband and his wife jointly. The position of the adopted child in the
law of intestate succession is governed by a reading-together of ss 17, 20(1) and 20(2)
of the Child Care Act with s 1(4)(e) and 1(5) of the Intestate Succession Act. See De
Waal & Schoeman-Malan supra note 72 at 28–9. In Flynn v Farr supra note 72 para 21,
Davis J held that these provisions apply to ex lege adoptions only and ﬁnd no applica-
tion in respect of so-called de facto adoptions.
105 Section 17(c) of the Child Care Act determines that a child may be adopted by a
married person whose spouse is the parent of that child. Section 1(4)(e)(ii) of the
Intestate Succession Act renders intestate succession possible between an adopted
child and his or her natural parent if the natural parent was married to the adoptive
parent at the time of the adoption. Section 1(4)(e)(i) and (5) of the Intestate Succes-
sion Act determines that, in the application of s 1 of the Act, an adopted child is
THE SOUTH AFRICAN LAW JOURNAL484
JOBNAME: SALJ 09 Part 3 PAGE: 23 SESS: 7 OUTPUT: Thu Feb 25 09:31:06 2010
/dtp22/juta/juta/SALJ−2009−Part3/02article
simplicity the latter scenario is not indicated on the diagram). Finally, where
E is the natural child ofA, born from the marriage betweenAand C: E(iii).
F and G (A’s surviving parents) inherit A’s estate (in equal shares) only if
neither C nor E survivesA.106
(b) Legal development to date regarding Marriage 1
First, unions other than valid monogamous civil marriages were brought
within the ambit of the Intestate Succession Act. The Act currently also
applies107 where A and C were civil-union partners; A and C were spouses in
a monogamous Muslim marriage; A and C were spouses in a monogamous
Hindu marriage; A and C were spouses in a valid monogamous customary-
law marriage and A and C were partners in a permanent same-sex life-
partnership in which they undertook reciprocal duties of support.108
Secondly, the Civil Union Act expanded the rules governing adoption,
which, in turn, affected the position of the adopted child (E(ii)) under the
Intestate Succession Act. As indicated earlier, the Child Care Act determines
that a child may be adopted, inter alia, by a husband and his wife jointly.109
The prescript in s 13(2) of the Civil UnionAct that ‘marriage’, ‘husband’ and
‘wife’ are inclusive of civil-union partners, brought such partners within the
ambit of the Child Care Act in so far as the latter Act bears reference to
‘marriage’,110 ‘husband’111 and ‘wife’112 for purposes of adoption. As the
adopted child’s position regarding inheritance on intestacy is regulated by
both the Child Care Act and the Intestate Succession Act,113 adoptive
civil-union partners are therefore adoptive parents for purposes of inherit-
ance ab intestato, either inheritance by the adoptive civil-union partners
from their adopted child or inheritance by the adopted child from the
adoptive civil-union partners.
deemed the descendant of his or her adoptive parent(s) and that the adoptive parent(s)
is/are deemed the ancestor(s) of the adopted child.
106 Section 1(1)(d)(i).
107 See the table supra underVI (1).
108 See Wood-Bodley supra note 42 at 54ff on why the conferment of a right to
intestate inheritance on same-sex life-partners, while heterosexual life-partners are
not afforded a similar right, is not anomalous. However, note the draft Domestic
Partnerships Bill supra under IV (6).
109 Supra note 104.
110 Section 1 of the Child Care Act determines that ‘marriage’ for purposes of the
Act means anymarriage which is recognized in terms of SouthAfrican law or custom-
ary law, or which was concluded in accordance with a system of religious law subject
to speciﬁed procedures, and any reference to a husband, wife, widower, widow,
divorced person, married person or spouse shall be construed accordingly. Section 1
of the Children’sAct contains a similar provision.
111 Section 17(a).
112 Section 17(a).
113 Supra note 104.
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(c) Future legal development regarding Marriage 1114
Further changes to the rules governing adoption will occur when the
Children’s Act’s repeal of the Child Care Act115 and the implementation of
the Children’s Act’s adoption provisions are proclaimed; thereby affecting
the position of the adopted child in the law of intestate succession. Section
231 of the former Act116 makes provision for a range of possible adoptive
parents; for purposes of this discussion the following possibilities deserve
mention:
• a husband and wife,117 which, as already indicated, currently includes
civil-union partners;
• partners in a permanent domestic life-partnership;118
• other persons sharing a common household and forming a permanent
family unit;119
• a married person whose spouse is the parent of the child or a person
whose permanent domestic life-partner is the parent of the child.120
The last-mentioned three possibilities will in future render inheritance ab
intestato possible between a child and his or her adoptive permanent
domestic life-partners, adoptive persons sharing a common household and
forming a permanent family unit or the adoptive spouse or adoptive
permanent domestic life-partner of the child’s parent121 through a reading-
together of s 1(4)(e)(i) and (ii) of the Intestate Succession Act and s 231(1) of
the Children’sAct.
(d) The operation of the Intestate Succession Act regarding polygynous marriages
The Intestate Succession Act now also operates where the marital status of
the deceased, A, was polygynous by reason of Marriages 1 and 2 on the
diagram; ie where A left two surviving spouses, C and B, and (for ease of
discussion) two descendants, E and D.122
114 The discussion on the changes that will be effected upon the commencement of
the Reform of the Customary Law of Succession and Regulation of Related Matters
Act is not repeated here.
115 See Schedule 4 of the Children’sAct.
116 Section 231 had not commenced at the time of writing.
117 Section 231(1)(a)(i).
118 Section 231(1)(a)(ii). Note that the Children’s Act does not limit domestic life-
partnerships for this purpose to heterosexual partners; therefore, same-sex permanent
domestic life-partners will also be able to adopt.
119 Section 231(1)(a)(iii).
120 Section 231(1)(c).
121 In the last-mentioned instance, inheritance ab intestato between the adopted
child and the particular natural parent remains possible as is currently the case under
s 1(4)(e)(ii) of the Intestate SuccessionAct.
122 The explanation that follows is generic in so far as it is based on the general
principles stated in the Bhe and Hassam judgments as well as the provisions of the
Reform of Customary Law of Succession and Regulation of Related MattersAct and
the draft Bill on Islamic Marriages, but without taking arrangements peculiar to the
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C and B, as A’s surviving spouses, as well as D and E, as A’s surviving
intestate heirs in the ﬁrst parentela, share the estate only if its net value
exceeds R250 000. If it does not, C and B inherit A’s entire estate in equal
shares.123 If it does, but the estate’s net value is less than R500 000, C and B
each inherit R125 000 of A’s estate and D and E the (lesser) residue in equal
shares. However, if the estate’s net value is equal to or exceeds R500 000, C,
B, D and E each inherit an equal child’s share ofA’s estate.124A child’s share of
the estate is calculated by dividing its monetary value by four, which number
represents D and E, as A’s surviving children, plus two (the number of A’s
surviving spouses).125 Moreover, should E, a mentally healthy major,
renounce the right to receive her share of A’s estate, it is arguable that such
share will vest in equal shares in B and C.126 F and G (A’s surviving parents)
inheritA’s estate (in equal shares) only if B, C, D and E do not surviveA.127
VII CONCLUSION
Despite the static image that the law of succession often projects,128 it is a
vibrant area of the law that has undergone dramatic changes in recent times
and will continue to do so in future. These changes, necessitated by
constitutional demands of equality and human dignity as well as socio-
economic and legal realities regarding the devolution of deceased estates ab
intestato and deceased estates’ liability for spousal maintenance claims, were
predicted shortly after the advent of South Africa’s democratic constitutional
dispensation.129 However, commentators also warned that law reform in this
area would be difﬁcult, particularly in light of the ‘bewildering range of
possibilities’ that come to mind if the law is to cater for intestate inheritance
claims and maintenance claims against a deceased estate by persons who are
not traditionally regarded as the surviving spouse in a civil marriage.130 It is
heartening to see that the South African legislature and courts are facing
Act and Bill (eg a customary-law union between the deceased and a woman for the
purpose of providing children for the deceased’s spouse’s house) into account.
123 Section 1(1)(a).
124 Section 1(1)(c)(i) and (ii).
125 Section 1(4)(f) (as amended or, alternatively, supplemented by a paragraph (g) in
future).
126 Section 1(6). The Constitutional Court in Hassam was explicit that the words
‘or spouses’ follow the word ‘spouse’ wherever the latter words appears in s 1 of the
Act; therefore also for purposes of s 1(6) of the Act. The position explained supra in
note 102 will therefore apply mutatis mutandis here: even if B is not the biological
parent of E, a renunciation by E, as descendant ofA, occasions, on a literal interpreta-
tion of s 1(6) and given the position prescribed in Hassam in respect of polygynous
marriages, the vesting of a share of the repudiated beneﬁt not only in C, but also in B,
asA’s two surviving spouses.
127 Section 1(1)(d)(i).
128 See DeWaal supra note 9 at 162.
129 Ibid at 173–4.
130 Ibid at 173, quoting S M Cretney ‘Reform of intestacy: The best we can do?’
(1995) 111 The Law Quarterly Review 77 at 93–4.
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head-on the difﬁculties and challenges occasioned by giving legal shape to
the constitutional family in the law of succession. Moreover, it shows that the
law of succession is at the forefront of constitutional development!
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